Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated by Boucher, Lauren C.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 56 
Issue 3 Spring 2007 Article 10 
2007 
Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the 
Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated 
Lauren C. Boucher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren C. Boucher, Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the Erroneously 
Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1069 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss3/10 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ADVANCING THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF
STATE COMPENSATION FOR THE ERRONEOUSLY
CONVICTED AND WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED
Lauren C. Boucher*
Although erroneous convictions and wrongful incarcerations have been
occurring since the advent of prison itself, these problems have taken on
a new sense of urgency in recent years with the arrival of important scien-
tific advances. Between 1989, when the first exoneration by DNA evi-
dence took place in the United States,2 and 2003, there were 340 con-
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law; B.A., 2004, The George Washington University, Elliot School of International
Affairs. The author wishes to thank all her family and friends for their encouragement, the
editors and staff of the Catholic University Law Review for all their hard work, and Profes-
sor J.P. Ogilvy and Dree Collopy for their invaluable assistance and insight. The author
also wishes to thank her parents and her brother for their unending love and support, as
well as Laura Osterman and Dan Moshenberg for inspiring her. Finally, the author would
like to thank Jeff Lakin for his patience and love, for picking her up at school at all hours
of the night, and for keeping her sane this year.
1. See Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA Lens, 60 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) ("In recent times, no development has transformed the
practice of criminal justice as much as DNA evidence. In little over fifteen years, DNA
profiling has produced nothing short of a paradigm shift."); see also Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003,95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523,
523 (2005) (referring to the first DNA exonerations as "the beginning of a revolution in
the American criminal justice system. Until then, exonerations of falsely convicted defen-
dants were seen as aberrational. Since 1989, these once-rare events have become disturb-
ingly commonplace."); Torsten Ove, State Doesn't Give Dime to the Innocent,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZE TE, Aug. 7,2005, at A-1 (quoting a Pennsylvania state legislator
as saying "'[sjcience is catching up with law enforcement. We're finding that we do make
mistakes .... We owe these folks more than a shrug and bus fare home."').
2. Gross et al., supra note 1, at 523 (listing Gary Dotson of Illinois as the first pris-
oner exonerated on the basis of DNA identification). Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the
common name for molecules that carry genetic information. Rob Warden, Ctr. on Wrong-
ful Convictions, What is DNA? (Mar. 22, 2002), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/
clinic/wrongful/documents/DNA.htm. DNA is contained in almost every cell, so that a
sample of a person's DNA can be found in their blood, hair, bones, saliva, and many other
body parts and fluids. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING DNA EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR VICTIM SERVICE
PROVIDERS (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/bc000657.pdf. No two
people have the exact same DNA (with the exception of identical twins). Id. In addition,
the DNA molecule is stable, making it available for testing long after a crime is first com-
mitted. Cheng, supra note 1, at 649; see also Walter F. Rowe, Foreword to EDWARD
CONNORS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY
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firmed exonerations' These convictions were overturned both on the
basis of DNA evidence, as well as other means, but all were based on
evidence of actual innocence. Year by year, the number of exonerations
has consistently risen, with numbers "increas[ing] rapidly in the last sev-
eral years."5
This is due in large part to scientific and technological advances like the
"DNA revolution."6 Nearly half of those exonerated from 1989 to 2003
established their innocence through DNA evidence One example of
such a case is that of Robert Clark.8 Clark was convicted of rape, kid-
napping, and armed robbery in 1982, and sentenced to life in prison. 9 The
victim of the crime identified Clark as her assailant, saying there was "no
doubt in her mind" that Clark was the offender.' ° In 2005, twenty-three
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, at xv, xv (1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf. These features make DNA evidence an ex-
tremely important and effective tool for law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and defend-
ers. See Janet Reno, Message from the Attorney General, in CONNORS ET AL., supra, at iii,
iii; President's DNA Initiative, DNA and Forensic Identification, http://www.dna.
gov/basics/forensicidentification (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
DNA testing is done by comparing a suspect's DNA to DNA found at the scene of a
crime. See Human Genome Project Information, DNA Forensics, http://www.ornl.
gov/scitechresources[HumanGenome/elsi/forensics.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
Because human DNA differs in 13 specific regions in every person, the variable regions of
DNA found at the scene of a crime are used to create a DNA profile of the perpetrator. A
profile is also created from the suspect's DNA, and the two are compared by looking for
matches "based on sequence or on numbers of small repeating units of DNA sequence"
between the profiles. Id. If the profiles do not match, the DNA at the crime scene could
not have belonged to the defendant. Id. Because only one-tenth of one percent of DNA is
different in every person, one or two matches between the samples would not be enough to
conclude the suspect contributed the DNA at the crime scene. See id. Four or five
matches, however, would provide very strong evidence that the suspect did contribute the
DNA. See id. Although it is possible that another person could have the same DNA pro-
file (because it is based on short sequences, and not on the person's entire DNA se-
quence), "the odds are exceedingly slim." Id.
DNA evidence first entered United States criminal courtrooms in 1987. CONNORS ET
AL., supra, at 4. Since then, it has "revolutionized forensic science and the criminal justice
system." Rowe, supra, at xv. DNA has also been a powerful tool in discovering and cor-
recting erroneous convictions. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524.
3. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524.
4. Id. at 523-24 (showing that the 340 exonerations between 1989 and 2003 were
based on evidence of actual innocence).
5. Id. at 527.
6. See id. at 528.
7. See id. at 524.
8. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Robert Clark, http://www.innocence




2007] Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated
years after he was convicted, DNA testing conclusively proved Clark's
innocence," and he was released from prison.1
2
Unfortunately, stories like this are not uncommon today." Perhaps
even more unfortunate is the fact that the majority of people exonerated
in the United States receive no compensation for the erroneous depriva-
tion of their freedom. 14 The majority of states have failed to enact legisla-
tion to compensate these individuals upon their release.15 As the number
of exonerations continues to increase, however, it is becoming more diffi-
cult for states to skirt this important issue. 6 State legislatures must devise
11. Id. The tests proved that another man already in prison for a separate offense was
the actual perpetrator of the crime. Id.
12. Id. On December 8, 2005, twenty-four years after he was put in prison, Robert
Clark was released, becoming the fifth person exonerated by DNA evidence in the State of
Georgia. Id.
13. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 523-28; The Innocence Project, Know the Cases:
Browse Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited
Apr. 19,2007).
14. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACrUAL INNOCENCE 230 (2000) (indicating that only
thirty-seven percent of those wrongfully incarcerated receive any compensation).
15. See Life After Exoneration Program, Wrongful Conviction/Incarceration Com-
pensation Statute Summary (2006), http://www.exonerated.org/files/Compensation%
20Statutes%20chart.xls [hereinafter Compensation Statutes Chart]. Only twenty-one
states and the District of Columbia currently have statutes that provide for compensation.
See id. (listing the states with compensation statutes: Alabama, California, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin). Five states have compensation legislation pending. These states
are Hawaii, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont. Id. The federal government
provides compensation for wrongful imprisonment as well, but does not require compensa-
tion on the part of state governments. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513 (West Supp. 2006). State
compensation is still necessary, because federal compensation is only available for federal
convictions. See id.
16. See Ove, supra note 1 (noting that states are "recogniz[ing] the growing issue").
One reason for the increase in exonerations is that post-conviction DNA testing has be-
come available to prisoners through a number of different channels, including statutes and
the work of independent organizations. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600 (West Supp. 2006) (provid-
ing for testing for federal convictions by written motion); President's DNA Initiative,
About the Initiative, http://dna.gov/info/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) (stating that President
Bush announced the $1 Billion "President's DNA Initiative" in March 2003, which is de-
signed in part to increase access to post-conviction DNA testing); The Innocence Project,
About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2007) [hereinafter About the Innocence Project]. A number of states have enacted post-
conviction DNA testing statutes, though the criteria regarding who may apply for testing
under such statutes differs. See Kathy Swedlow, Don't Believe Everything You Read: A
Review of Modern "Post-Conviction" DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 355, 355-
60 (2002); see also Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Comparison of State Post Conviction
DNA Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/DNAchart.htm (last visited Apr.
19,2007).
Private organizations have also helped increase access to DNA testing for prisoners.
See generally About the Innocence Project, supra. The Innocence Project, the most widely
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a response to ensure justice for the wrongfully incarcerated. 7
Some states have already taken action by enacting compensation stat-
utes; there are a number of legally and morally compelling arguments for
doing so.' One argument is based on the theory of eminent domain-
that when the government takes property from a private citizen, it must
compensate that person.19 Another common argument, the strict liability
theory, considers it unfair that a few individuals should be forced to bear
the burden of errors of the criminal justice system when everyone reaps
the benefits of that system.20 Simply put, many people feel that compen-
sating someone for wrongful incarceration is "[t]he least the community
can do.,
21
recognized of these organizations, is a non-profit legal clinic that works to prove innocence
through DNA evidence. Id. The Center on Wrongful Convictions provides representation
to prisoners with claims of actual innocence. Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Our Mission,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 19,
2007). In some cases, the Center's investigation leads to DNA testing that proves the
client's innocence. E.g., Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Juan Rivera Wins New Trial, http:
//www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/Rivera.htm (last visited
Apr. 19, 2007).
As a result of increased access to post-conviction DNA testing, some commentators feel
it is possible that the high rate of exonerations will continue, and more erroneously con-
victed individuals will seek redress. Ove, supra note 1 (quoting the opinion of a Pennsyl-
vania state legislator: "'It's going to keep happening.... Science is the great equalizer."').
However, some experts think that the number of exonerations is bound to decrease in the
future. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Com-
pensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE
L. REV. 703, 714 (2004). Although access to DNA testing has increased, a prisoner's abil-
ity to prove his innocence through DNA is still dependent on other factors, such as
whether crime scene evidence is still available. See id. at 713-15. As Professor Bernhard
notes:
Naturally, there may be any number of innocent individuals in prison unable to win
their freedom because rape kits or other physical evidence have been destroyed.
Moreover, most cases-e.g., robberies, thefts, or drug offenses-involve no testable
material. In those situations, innocent people are rarely able to establish their inno-
cence.
Id. at 715 n.68.
17. See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 101 (1999) ("Passage of indemnification legislation
would create for all what already exists for some-an accessible, reliable and swift remedy
triggered by the status of the claimant and the harm endured, rather than the negligence or
wrongdoing of the individuals, or municipalities which inflicted the injury.").
18. Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. REV.
201,207-08 (1941).
19. Id. at 207; see infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
20. See Borchard, supra note 18, at 208; infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
21. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 112 (quoting EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 392 (1932)).
[Vol. 56:10691072
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However, there are also a number of reasons why the majority of states
have not enacted compensation statutes. 2' Legislators are often con-
cerned with the cost and manner of enforcing such legislation.2 In addi-
tion, some commentators feel that the state is not at fault, and has no
legal obligation to provide compensation.24
These arguments have traditionally been rebutted with the strict liabil-
ity theory2 While the strict liability argument has been important to the
compensation movement, it has not been entirely successful in convincing
26the majority of the states to enact compensation statutes.
This Comment argues in favor of state compensation for the wrongfully
convicted and incarcerated by offering further support to the notion that
the state should be held strictly liable for compensating individual vic-
tims. In Part I, this Comment reviews the most common causes of erro-
neous conviction, and then examines the different compensation methods
currently available to the wrongfully incarcerated. In Part II, this Com-
ment finds that the state can enact measures to prevent the most common
causes of erroneous conviction, and concludes that compensation statutes
are the most effective way to ensure efficient and fair compensation.
Next, this Comment discusses the arguments both for and against state
compensation for the wrongfully incarcerated. Finally, in Part III, bor-
rowing from the economic theory of the least cost avoider, this Comment
concludes that states should be held strictly liable for compensating the
wrongfully incarcerated. States, as opposed to individuals, are in the best
position to prevent erroneous convictions in the first place. Conse-
quently, the responsibility for providing compensation falls clearly in the
hands of states. More effort must be made to convince legislatures in
those states that do not offer compensation that it is the state's responsi-
bility to do so, and the least cost avoider theory should be used in the
process.
22. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 713. Legislators cite the cost of enforcing such legisla-
tion and the concern that "undeserving individuals will recover" as two main deterrents
from enacting compensation statutes. Id.
23. See id.
24. Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal
Justice, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 695-96 (1913); see also Bernhard,
supra note 17, at 92.
25. See John J. Johnston, Reasonover v. Washington: Toward a Just Treatment of the
Wrongly Convicted in Missouri, 68 UMKC L. REv. 411, 414 (2000) (contending that strict
liability is "the most philosophically and procedurally sound [theory] for imposing liability
on a state"); Keith S. Rosenn, Compensating the Innocent Accused, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 705,
715-17 (1976) (noting that the strict liability theory is "conceptually superior" to other
theories supporting state compensation).
26. See Compensation Statutes Chart, supra note 15 (indicating that twenty-two U.S.
jurisdictions currently have statutes that provide for compensation).
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I. THE CAUSES OF ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS AND CURRENT
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED
With the recent surge in exonerations and the scientific advancements
of the past twenty years, society is now able to examine and discover the• • 27
causes of erroneous convictions. As a result of such research, the mostS 21
common causes of erroneous convictions are now widely recognized.
With this knowledge in hand, states must act to ensure that those who are
wrongfully incarcerated have an effective remedy available to compen-
sate them for the erroneous deprivation of their liberty. 9
A. Common Causes of Erroneous Convictions
There are a number of common causes of erroneous convictions.
Three of the leading causes are mistaken eyewitness identification, crime
lab error, and ineffective assistance of counsel.0
1. Mistaken Eyewitness Identification
The most common cause of erroneous conviction is mistaken eyewit-
ness identification." One example is the case of Ronald Cotton, who was
convicted of rape and burglary in 1985.32 Cotton was convicted primarily
27. See Ronald S. Reinstein, Commentary to CONNORS ET AL., supra note 2, at xxi,
xxi (acknowledging that DNA exonerations have provided invaluable research opportuni-
ties and insight into the causes of erroneous conviction); Brian Forst, Op-Ed., The Cost of
Errant Justice, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2006, at A23 ("The use of modem management
methods and more widespread availability of effective forensic technology could go a long
way to solve more of these crimes and reduce both types of error. DNA evidence gives us
a unique window into errors for those crimes for which the evidence is available and rele-
vant."); see also Jean Coleman Blackerby, Life After Death Row: Preventing Wrongful
Capital Convictions and Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179,
1225 (2003) (concluding that DNA exonerations offer a new view of the criminal justice
system, particularly in the case of capital convictions).
28. See The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: The Causes of Wrongful
Conviction, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) [here-
inafter Causes of Wrongful Conviction]; infra Part I.A.1-3.
29. See infra note 139.
30. Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 28.
31. BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 8 (1995); SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at
263 (indicating that in sixty-two exonerations by DNA evidence, mistaken identification
was a factor in the original conviction fifty-two times, more than any other factor exam-
ined); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2 (1998) ("[C]ases of proven
wrongful convictions of innocent people have consistently shown that mistaken eyewitness
identification is responsible for more of these wrongful convictions than all other causes
combined....").
32. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Ronald 'Cotton, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/72.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
1074 [Vol. 56:1069
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on the basis of the eyewitness testimony of the victim.33 During the at-
tack, the victim "studied every single detail on the rapist's face" 4 in order
to "make sure that he was put in prison."" The victim first identified
Cotton among police photos and then again in a lineup.36 She later
stated, "I knew this was the man. I was completely confident. I was
sure."37 Eleven years after Cotton was convicted, DNA tests proved that
another man, who was already in prison for an unrelated offense, was the
actual perpetrator of the crime. 38
Eyewitness testimony and identifications are an extremely important
part of our legal system, as investigators and attorneys rely heavily on this
type of evidence.39 However, cases of mistaken identity in the criminal
justice system are not uncommon; in the first 130 DNA exonerations in
the United States, mistaken identification was a factor in 101 of the origi-
nal wrongful convictions.4° The Supreme Court has even recognized the
risk of misidentification associated with eyewitness testimony, stating that
"[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.
4 1
Because the problems with eyewitness identification are commonly
recognized, there is a great deal of scientific research on the topic.42 It is
33. See id.
34. Jennifer Thompson, Op-Ed., 'I Was Certain, But I Was Wrong,' N.Y. TIMES, June




38. CONNORS ET AL., supra note 2, at 44; Thompson, supra note 34.
39. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 31, at 6. The reliance stems partly from simple
convention: "The legal system always has relied on the testimony of eyewitnesses." NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 1 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf [herein-
after NIJ EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE GUIDE]. In addition, it is axiomatic that eyewitness
identification is extremely helpful evidence-it has continuously played a vital role in
investigating and charging criminal defendants. See CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 31, at
6; NIJ EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE GUIDE, supra, at iii.
40. Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 28. In addition, a number of field
experiments on eyewitness identification resulted in an average false identification rate of
thirty-five point eight percent. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 31, at 10-12. The authors
note that one major difference between field research and actual crime victims is the ab-
sence of the emotional stress on the identifier in the research setting, and that "[t]he effects
of emotional duress on eyewitness memory in general, and identification accuracy in par-
ticular" are not clear. Id. at 13. However, the authors are led "to believe that if there is
any bias, the field studies overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications." Id.
41. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,228 (1967).
42. Wells et al., supra note 31, at 32 (noting that research in this area has been "exten-
sive"); see also Jack P. Lipton, Legal Aspects of Eyewitness Testimony, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 7, 7 (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer
et al. eds., 1996) ("It is evident that psychologists have conducted more research dealing
with eyewitness testimony than with any other question of law.").
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now generally understood that due to psychological factors, the proce-
dures used by law enforcement agents in obtaining eyewitness identifica-
tions commonly contribute to erroneous results. 43 Fortunately, however,
recent research has shown that simple changes in these procedures can be
extremely effective in preventing cases of mistaken identification." Spe-
cifically, implementing "double-blind sequential lineup" procedures-in
which the witness sees one lineup member at a time, rather than all at
45once - can greatly reduce the odds of a mistake.46 This procedure suc-
cessfully decreases the probability of error by reducing the likelihood of
relative judgment-a process by which a witness will choose the lineup
member that most closely resembles the witness' memory of the perpe-
trator-on the part of the eyewitness,47 and by reducing the possibility
43. See Wells et al., supra note 31, at 32-33.
44. Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's
Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 381, 382-83
(2006).
45. David L. Feige, "I'll Never Forget That Face": The Science and Law of the Double-
Blind Sequential Lineup, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 28, 29. Sequential lineup proce-
dures mandate that the eyewitness be presented with one lineup member at a time, as
opposed to the traditional method of presenting all the lineup members at once. Klobu-
char et al., supra note 44, at 388-89. Blind lineup procedures dictate that the lineup admin-
istrator be unaware of which lineup member is the suspect. The Innocence Project, Fix the
System: Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-
Identification.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2007). "This is known as a 'double-blind' proce-
dure, because neither the administrator nor the witness knows who is the suspect." SHERI
H. MECKLENBURG, ILL. STATE POLICE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 4 (2006), available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/
faculty/gwells/IllinoisReport.pdf.
46. Feige, supra note 45, at 28 ("Seeking an order for a double-blind sequential lineup
affords a court the opportunity to employ a procedure shown to decrease the chances of an
innocent person being wrongly identified by 50 percent, while being just as effective in
correctly identifying criminal suspects.").
47. Klobuchar et al., supra note 44, at 388.
[E]yewitnesses tend to compare lineup members using a process called relative judg-
ment to determine which most closely resembles the eyewitness's memory of the per-
petrator. Even when the true perpetrator is absent from the lineup, it is likely that
one of the fillers used in the lineup will provide a better relative match to the witness's
memory than the others. This process can increase the risk of a misidentification.
Id. (footnotes omitted). With sequential lineups, however, "[a]lthough the eyewitness
could compare the person being viewed to those viewed previously, the eyewitness cannot
be sure that the next person to be viewed will not be an even better likeness to the culprit.
Hence, the eyewitness must rely more on an absolute judgment process." Wells et al.,
supra note 31, at 13. In attempting to thwart relative judgment, it is also important to
instruct the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup, so that
the witness does not "rely solely on a relative-judgment process." Id. at 11.
1076 [Vol. 56:1069
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that the lineup administrator could influence the witness through clues,
inadvertently or not.48
Some jurisdictions have implemented these procedures in response to
the problems with eyewitness identification.4 9 For instance, in 2001, New
Jersey became the first state to officially adopt the procedures outlined
by the U.S. Department of Justice in its Eyewitness Evidence Guidelines."
The New Jersey Attorney General noted two particularly important pro-
48. Klobuchar et al., supra note 44, at 389 ("[T]he double-blind... procedure helps to
secure accurate eyewitness accounts by eliminating the potential for inadvertent influence
by the officer conducting the lineup. A lineup administrator who does not know the iden-
tity of the suspect is unlikely to influence the witness through verbal or nonverbal cues."
(footnote omitted)). As with sequential lineup procedures, explicit directions to the eye-
witness also help to promote accuracy, because "notifying the witness that the officer does
not know which lineup member is the suspect, affords the additional advantage that the
witness is less likely to seek or infer cues from the officer's behavior." Id.
While a large body of research experiments has concluded that these procedures would
reduce the likelihood of mistaken eyewitness identification, see id. at 382-83, at least one
recent study finds otherwise. MECKLENBURG, supra note 45, at 61-62. The Illinois report
compared data from both double-blind sequential lineups and traditional simultaneous
lineups in three different jurisdictions. Id. at 24-25. Two of the three jurisdictions "re-
corded a statistically higher rate of known false identifications using the sequential, dou-
ble-blind method than using the simultaneous method." Id. at 46. Accordingly, the report
does not recommend the implementation of such procedures, but rather urges "the crimi-
nal justice system to explore other areas of improvement to eyewitness identification." Id.
at 61-62.
Perhaps it is true, as one of the originators of the sequential double-blind procedure,
Professor Gary Wells, has said: "'Fixation on the sequential procedure is creating a certain
degree of myopia with regard to seeing the broad problems with lineups."' Id. at 62 (quot-
ing Professor Wells). In any case, it has been proven that mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion leads to more erroneous convictions than any other cause. Wells et al., supra note 31,
at 2. Because of this fact, "'[w]e need to find ways to prevent mistaken IDs from happen-
ing in the first place."' Amanda Paulson & Sara Miller Llana, In Police Lineups, Is the
Method the Suspect?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Apr. 24, 2006, at 1 (quoting Professor
Wells).
49. The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note
45 ("The state of New Jersey, large cities such as Minneapolis, MN and Seattle, WA and
small towns such as Northampton, MA and others have implemented these practices ....
Numerous other jurisdictions, such as the states of North Carolina and Illinois, as well as
Boston, Massachusetts and other cities, are now beginning to implement these proce-
dures.").
50. Memorandum from John Farmer, Attorney Gen. of N.J. (Apr. 18, 2001), available
at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf [hereinafter Farmer Memorandum].
In response to the problems with mistaken identification, the U.S. Department of Justice
assembled the Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, which produced a
guide of recommended eyewitness evidence procedures for law enforcement in 1999. See
NIJ EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 33-37. It should be noted that al-
though the U.S. Department of Justice published this document and links to it on their
website, it was not actually prepared by the Department, but "supported by a contract with
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice. [Thus], [t]he opin-
ions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice." Id.
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cedural changes." The first is that "whenever practical, someone other
than the primary investigator assigned to a case [should] conduct both
photo and live lineup identification. ,52  Second, "sequential lineups
should be utilized for both photo and live lineup identifications."53 Al-
though New Jersey is the first jurisdiction to officially implement these
procedures, more and more states are beginning to recognize and adopt
them as a means for improving the accuracy of eyewitness identification.
54
2. Crime Lab Error
Another common cause of erroneous convictions is crime lab error."
Crime lab error is a rather broad category, consisting not only of innocent
errors, such as contamination of evidence and misinterpretation of re-
sults, but also intentional ones, such as falsified results, falsified expert
credentials, and statistical exaggeration.6 In the case of Jimmy Ray
Bromgard, the erroneous testimony of the prosecutor's forensic scientist
proved pivotal in obtaining a conviction. The expert testified that
"there was less than a one in ten thousand .. .chance that the hairs
[found at the scene of the crime] did not belong to Bromgard."'58 In 2002,
after Bromgard spent more than fourteen years in prison, DNA tests per-
formed on crime scene evidence conclusively proved his innocence.59
51. Farmer Memorandum, supra note 50, at 1-2.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2.
54. See supra note 49; see also Paulson & Liana, supra note 48 ("Commissions in
North Carolina, Wisconsin, Virginia, and California have recommended that approach,
and other jurisdictions are considering it .... Boston switched to the sequential method in
2004, after a series of wrongful convictions that involved mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion made headlines.").
55. See The Innocence Project, News and Information: Crime Lab Oversight,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/312.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter
Crime Lab Fact Sheet] ("The Innocence Project has found crime lab errors, both inadver-
tent and calculated, to be a leading contributor to wrongful convictions.").
56. See The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Forensic Science Misconduct,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Forensic-Science-Misconduct.php (last visited
Apr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Forensic Science Misconduct]; Crime Lab Fact Sheet, supra
note 55.
57. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Jimmy Ray Bromgard,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/61.php (last visited Apr. 19,2007).
58. Id.
59. Id. After Bromgard's release, a panel of five forensic scientists reviewed the tes-
timony of the prosecutor's scientist, finding that "[t]he witness's testimony ... contains
egregious misstatements not only of the science of forensic hair examinations but also of
genetics and statistics.... His testimony is completely contrary to generally accepted scien-
tific principles." RICHARD BISBING ET AL., PEER REVIEW REPORT: MONTANA V. JIMMY
RAY BROMGARD (2004), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/
bromgard-print-versionl.html.
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In recent years, crime lab problems have gained national attention6 In
the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2004, Congress took measures to
combat the problem. 6' Among other recommendations, the Act called
for the Attorney General to appoint a National Forensic Science Com-
mission to determine and disseminate the best practices for forensic
analysis, and to increase the number of qualified forensic scientists. 62
States are also responding to the crime lab problems.63 In 2005, the
Texas legislature enacted a law that establishes independent, expert over-
sight for Texas crime labs.64 The bill provides for the creation of the
Texas Forensic Science Commission, which will investigate all claims of
professional negligence and require lab personnel to report any miscon-
duct.65 Although Texas is the first jurisdiction to take such active meas-
ures against crime lab error, it seems likely that other states will also take
measures to fight the problem.66
60. See generally Tomas Guillen & Eric Nalder, Solutions to Problems are Clear,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 23, 1994, at A16 (calling for state and national level reforms); Steve
McVicker, HPD Admits It Failed to Review Suspect Lab Work, HOUSTON CHRON., June 2,
2005, at B1 (citing "numerous problems" in the Houston Police Department's DNA, toxi-
cology, ballistics, and serology divisions); Maurice Possley, Steve Mills & Flynn
McRoberts, Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at 1 ("[E]vidence
of problems ranging from negligence to outright deception has been uncovered at crime
labs in at least 17 states"); Paula Zahn Now: Reasonable Doubt: Can Crime Labs Be
Trusted? (CNN television broadcast Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.comiTRANSCRIPTS/0501/13/pzn.01.html) ("[A] joint investigation
by CNN and the center for Investigative Reporting reveals serious flaws in modern foren-
sic work."). In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court also recog-
nized the potential for faulty scientific evidence, directing lower court judges to determine
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and
... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue"
when they are faced with expert scientific testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509
U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). In so directing, the Court set out a number of guiding factors,
such as whether the scientific technique used can or has been tested, what the technique's
known or potential rate of error is, and whether the technique is "generally accepted" in
the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-95.
61. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14136-14136d (West 2005).
62. Id. § 14136c; see also President's DNA Initiative, About the Initiative, supra note
16; NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, STATUS AND NEEDS OF FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE
PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-4 (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.
org/pdffilesl/nij/213420.pdf [hereinafter NIJ FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT].
63. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
64. See id. art. 38.01, §§ 1-4.
65. Id.
66. See generally Ruth Teichroeb, Call For a Review of State Crime Labs, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 14, 2004, at 1 (reporting that one legislator was concerned
about the state's crime lab problems, saying "'I'm going to ask for a review during this
upcoming session of the Legislature .... People's lives are at stake,"' and noting that the
director of the state crime lab system "said he'd welcome scrutiny from state legislators.");
C.S. Murphy & Amy Upshaw, Budget, Competing Pressures Hamstring Crime Lab, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 2004, at 1A (quoting the head of the state crime lab's
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3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A third common cause of erroneous convictions is ineffective defense
counsel.67 One illustrative example is the case of Dennis Williams, who
was convicted of murder in 1962 due to his defense attorney's "uninspir-
ing performance." ' The attorney did not object to the prosecution's ra-
cially motivated jury selection, failed to talk to forensic experts regarding
crime scene evidence, and overlooked a simple timing problem in a key
witness' testimony that may have helped avoid his client's conviction. 
69
Williams was eventually granted a new trial and his new lawyers obtained
a reversal of his conviction. 0 His original attorney was later disbarred.7'
According to the unanimous Supreme Court decision of Gideon v.
Wainwright, the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is a fundamen-
tal constitutional right that must be enforced by state courts.72 Practically,
this means states are required to provide an attorney to any criminal de-
fendant facing imprisonment who cannot afford one.73 In addition, it has
long been recognized that "'the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.' ' 74 Although this state obligation is clearly outlined
in Supreme Court case law, many commentators believe that most of the
indigent defense systems that exist today do not come close to meeting
forensic biology section as saying "'[alt some point the state of Arkansas or the powers
that be in the Legislature have to decide what they're willing to invest to fight crime').
67. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 187 ("Studies by the Innocence Project found
that 27 percent of the wrongfully convicted had subpar or outright incompetent legal
help.").
68. Id. at 183-85.
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id. at 185-86. Upon hearing the disbarment case of Williams' defense attorney
Archie Weston, an astute justice on the Illinois Supreme Court remembered Williams as
one of Weston's clients and convinced his fellow justices to rehear the case. Id.
71. In re Weston, 448 N.E.2d 236,240 (Ill. 1982).
72. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963). The Court concluded that
"certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal
action, are also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid
of counsel in a criminal prosecution." Id. (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 243-44 (1936)). The Court went on to say: "[The assistance of counsel] is one of the
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458,462 (1938)).
73. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (establishing the right to counsel for
misdemeanors involving a suspended sentence); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38
(1972) (establishing the right to counsel for misdemeanors involving possible imprison-
ment); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (establishing the right to counsel for felony trials).
74. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n.14 (1970)).
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that obligation. 75 As a result, "[t]he poor person is often assigned a law-
yer who lacks the knowledge, skills, or even the spirit to defend a case
properly. ,6
In response to this "growing national crisis" 77 surrounding public de-
fense systems, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Ten
Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (Principles) as a guide for
state officials seeking to develop or improve their public defense sys-
tems. 8  The Principles dictate that the state should make resources
equally available to prosecuting attorneys and defense attorneys. 9 They
also advise that the state should routinely review public defense attorneys
to ensure quality and efficiency.' °
In 2005, Montana became the first state to enact legislation specifically
based on the Principles.8 The Montana law creates a statewide public
defender system that will provide services in all of the courts in the
state.82 It aims to ensure that qualified and competent attorneys are pro-
vided to those who cannot afford an attorney, and that sufficient public
funding is made available to the new statewide system.83 With Montana
75. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
783, 784 (1997). According to The Constitution Project, nearly half of the states do not
fund indigent defense systems primarily at the state level, but rather, leave the responsibil-
ity to counties. The Constitution Project, Right to Counsel Initiative, http://www.
constitutionproject.org/righttocounsel/resources.cfm?categoryld=6 (follow hyperlink to
footnote 1) (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) (noting that only twenty-two states fund indigent
defense systems entirely at the state level, six states fund at least seventy-five percent of
indigent defense costs, eighteen states rely primarily on county funding, and two states
provide no funding at all at the state level). The group notes:
[T]he states' abdication of their constitutional obligation has produced a myriad of in-
digent defense systems that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and the
competency of the services rendered. Documentation of the failure of states that do
not fund at least 75 percent of indigent defense services grows with each passing day.
Id.
76. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 188; see also The Constitution Project, Right to
Counsel Initiative, supra note 75 (giving examples of failures on the part of indigent de-
fense systems in states where funding for those systems does not come primarily from the
state).
77. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Hails Montana's Public Defense
Bill as Leading National Trend (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/crim
justice/indigent/10248prs2005O6O8.html.
78. AM. BAR ASS'N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [hereinafter ABA TEN PRINCIPLES].
79. Id. at 1, 3.
80. Id. at 3.
81. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 77.
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-102 (2005).
83. Id.
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leading the way, there is "a clear trend among states to develop some sort
of statewide oversight."84
These steps taken by the federal government and some states are sig-
nificant improvements that can help reduce the rate of erroneous convic-
tions and wrongful incarceration.o Although eliminating erroneous con-
victions in the first place should be the focus of policies in this area, 6 in-
dividuals who have been wrongfully incarcerated also deserve some at-
tention and compensation from the state."'
B. Current Ways to Seek Compensation from the State for
Wrongful Incarceration
Although state compensation for the erroneously convicted and wrong-
fully incarcerated individual is rare, there are currently three ways to seek
indemnification for wrongful incarceration: tort suits against the govern-
ment, private "moral obligation" bills, and general enabling statutes.8"
1. Tort Suits Against the State
Fault-based governmental tort liability is one possible route to com-
pensation.89 However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity limits the
chances of success of such actions.9° This doctrine applies to both the
state as an entity, as well as to most government officials, and provides
that the government cannot be sued without its consent.9' Some jurisdic-
84. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMs: 2005
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
statewideinddefsystems2005.pdf; see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra
note 77 ("Similar efforts to reform access to the court system are underway in Michigan,
Louisiana and Virginia. In May, North Dakota passed a law creating a public defender
commission to oversee indigent defense, which the ACLU says was due to the comprehen-
sive reform effort in the neighboring state of Montana.")-
85. See infra Part II.A.1-3.
86. See Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 28 ("The lessons learned from
these exonerations must be used to prevent all wrongful convictions ... ").
87. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 74 ("[S]ociety has a moral obligation to assist the
wrongfully convicted .... ").
88. Christine L. Zaremski, Comment, The Compensation of Erroneously Convicted
Individuals in Pennsylvania, 43 Duo. L. REv. 429,433 (2005).
89. Id.
90. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86-92; Joseph H. King, Jr., Comment, Compensation
of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1091, 1099-1103 (1970).
"[T]he concept of governmental immunity combined with the burdens placed upon liti-
gants in these situations creates an almost impenetrable barrier for any possibility of suc-
cess." Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433.
91. King, supra note 90, at 1099.
The concept of sovereign immunity is solidified in the Eleventh Amendment, and has
been interpreted to bar suits brought by a citizen in federal court against (1) his or her
own state, and (2) state officials acting within the scope of their authority. Suits
against a state or its officials are generally barred in state courts due to a lack of juris-
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tions have partially waived immunity,9 allowing an erroneously convicted
and incarcerated individual to sue the state or one of its agents on the
basis of common law tort.93
Individuals who have attempted to seek redress in this manner have
done so most commonly under the tort theories of false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution.4 However, the legal requirements placed on
a plaintiff in these suits usually serve as an insurmountable barrier to re-
lief.95 Both of these theories require evidence that there was no probable
cause for the defendant's actions. False imprisonment requires evidence
that the confinement was obtained through an unlawful arrest.7 There-
fore, if there was probable cause for the arrest, the defendant (the state
agent or entity responsible for the harm) is relieved of liability.9 A de-
fendant is guilty of malicious prosecution only if "he initiates or procures
the proceedings without probable cause."' A conviction, however, con-
clusively establishes probable cause unless the plaintiff can show it wasS 100
obtained by fraud, perjury, or corruption. Because of such lofty re-
quirements, success is generally unlikely in tort suits like these.91
diction being conferred to the judiciary over such suits. In the absence of an express
waiver in the form of a legislative act, aspirations of recovery on the basis of tort-
liability are basically fruitless.
Zaremski, supra note 88, at 435-46 (footnotes omitted).
92. King, supra note 90, at 1103. "Waiver of sovereign immunity has been accom-
plished through both judicial abrogation and legislative waiver." Id. Most commonly,
waiver of immunity is accomplished through statutes that create a cause of action against
the state or private bills. See id. n.100.
93. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86-87. An additional remedy is found in the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id. at 86; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The Act "creates the statu-
tory basis for federal actions against state and local police officers for the deprivation of
civil rights." Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86. But, once again, this cause of action is only
available "when a claimant can establish that the person or entity responsible for the harm
was negligent." Id. Thus, a majority of the suits under the Federal Civil Rights Act tend
to yield the same outcome as those brought in common law tort. King, supra note 90, at
1101-02.
94. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86; King, supra note 90, at 1101; Zaremski, supra
note 88, at 433-34.
95. Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433.
96. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86; Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433-45.
97. See Zaremski, supra note 88, at 435.
98. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
100. Id. § 667.
101. King, supra note 90, at 1102-03; Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433.
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2. Private Legislative Bills
Legislative "moral obligation" bills are another means for seeking state
compensation.'0 These are acts directed at compensating specific indi-
viduals in cases where the individual cannot sustain a legal claim.
0 3
These acts allow state legislatures to recognize a debt the state should pay
on the basis of equity and fairness, rather than as a matter of law."M Like
tort suits, however, it is rare that this avenue to compensation results in
success because these bills are applied infrequently and inconsistently.'05
3. Compensation Statutes
The third and final way to get compensation from the state is through a
statute enacted by that state's legislature.0 These general compensation
statutes allow someone who has been wrongfully incarcerated to pursue a
claim against the state. 07 Twenty-one states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government have enacted compensation statutes.
0 8
102. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93-94. An example of such a bill was enacted in Flor-
ida on December 9, 2005 to compensate Wilton Dedge. See 2005 Fla. Laws 354. Dedge
spent twenty-two years in prison after being erroneously convicted of sexual battery and
burglary. Carrie Johnson & Steve Bousquet, State to Pay $2M for 22 Lost Years, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at lB. The bill awarded Dedge two million dollars in
compensation, acknowledging the damages he suffered due to the deprivation of his liberty
and the legal bills incurred by his family in defending him. 2005 Fla. Laws 354. It is inter-
esting to note that Dedge originally sought compensation through the courts, but the suit
was dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity. Id.
103. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93.
104. Id.
105. See AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 4 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/my05108a.pdf
[hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Bernhard, supra note 17, at 94.
106. Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433.
107. Johnston, supra note 25, at 419.
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (2000); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513 (West Supp. 2006); ALA. CODE §§
29-2-150 to -165 (LexisNexis 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2000 & Supp.
2006); D.C. CODE § 2-421 to -425 (2001); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West Supp.
2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (Supp.
2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241-8244 (1964); MD. CODE ANN. STATE FIN. &
PRoc. § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, §§ 1-9 (West Supp.
2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.055 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2005); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(II) (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West
2001); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 to -84 (2005);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48 to .49 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
51, § 154 (West Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (Supp. 2006); TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 to .003 (Vernon 2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
195.10 to 195.12 (2000 & Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis Supp.
2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2001); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 5
(noting that "nearly two thirds of the states do not have indemnification statutes").
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However, the statutes vary widely in conditions precedent to recovery
and compensation levels.'O°
One major difference among the statutes is that some of them (nine of
twenty-three) allow for recovery only if the individual has been convicted
of a felony.110 The ABA recommends that compensation be available to
all individuals wrongfully imprisoned, regardless of the level of the con-
viction."' Any individual who has been erroneously convicted deserves
recognition and compensation for the harm caused."2
Another important difference is that some statutes (five of twenty-
three) require a pardon from the governor before an individual can file aS• 113
claim. This requirement is an attempt on the part of legislators to en-
114sure that only the innocent are compensated. The ABA does not rec-
ommend this provision, however, because the discretionary nature of
gubernatorial pardons would most likely thwart the goal of uniform com-
pensation.
115
109. See Zaremski, supra note 88, at 436-37.
110. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (allowing for compensation in the case of an erroneous
felony conviction or at least two years of pretrial incarceration on a felony charge); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4900; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 1(C)(ii); MO. ANN. STAT. §
650.055(9)(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A) (including aggravated felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §
154(B)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(B).
111. ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 6. The ABA report is important, and serves as
a useful guideline for states drafting compensation statutes, because the ABA is a well-
respected organization made up of legal professionals that provides "programs to assist
lawyers and judges in their work, and initiatives to improve the legal system for the pub-
lic." Am. Bar Ass'n, About the American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/about/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2007). Lawmakers have followed ABA recommendations in the past,
as in the case of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Ctr.
For Prof'l Responsibility, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/modelrules.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) (noting that the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct "serve as models for the ethics rules of most states"). In
addition, judges respect ABA recommendations and standards, and often cite to them in
opinions. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,346 n.11 (1980) (citing the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility and Project on Standards for Criminal Justice in defining
"conflict of interests"); In re Clyne, 581 A.2d 1118, 1125 n.11 (Del. 1990) (citing the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in considering an attorney's disbarment).
112. See ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 6; see also Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93
("Basic fairness requires compensation for all if there is compensation for some.").
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(4); MD. CODE ANN. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(b); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-82.
114. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 103 ("There is no justifiable reason to condition
relief upon the acquisition of a pardon. Careful drafting can accomplish the same goal-
ensuring that only the innocent recover.").
115. ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 6 (noting that gubernatorial pardons are "highly
discretionary, and are often subject to political considerations."). Id.; see also Bernhard,
supra note 17, at 102 ("Experience shows that the pardon requirement can be an insur-
mountable barrier to recovery for deserving claimants because executive clemency is en-
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Furthermore, some compensation statutes (ten of twenty-three) pro-
hibit compensation where the claimant entered a guilty plea or confessed
to the offense for which he was erroneously convicted. This require-
ment is imposed to ensure that the person seeking compensation did not
do anything to bring about his own conviction."7 However, the ABA
does not recommend this provision either, because there are a number of
logical reasons why individuals might falsely confess or plead guilty, in-
cluding police coercion and the possibility of a lesser sentence.1
8
tirely discretionary. No one has the right to a pardon. A person may have been com-
pletely exonerated and nonetheless unable to obtain a pardon." (footnotes omitted)).
116. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring that the claimant "did
not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution"); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 4903 (requiring that the claimant "did not, by any act or omission on his part,
either intentionally or negligently, contribute to the bringing about of his arrest or convic-
tion for the crime with which he was charged"); D.C. CODE § 2-422(2) (2001) (requiring
that the claimant "did not, by his misconduct, cause or bring about his own prosecution");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.l(b) (West 1998) (requiring that the claimant "did not plead
guilty to the public offense charged, or to any lesser included offense"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:4C-3(c) (West 2001) (requiring that the claimant "did not by his own conduct cause or
bring about his conviction"); N.Y. CT. CL. ACr § 8-b(5)(d) (McKinney 1989) (requiring
that the claimant "did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (requiring that "[t]he individ-
ual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-
included offense by the court or jury involved"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(b)
(West Supp. 2006) (requiring that "the individual did not plead guilty to the offense
charged, or to any lesser included offense"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(B) (Supp.
2006) (defining "wrongfully incarcerated" to include that "the person incarcerated must
have entered a final plea of not guilty, or regardless of the plea, any person sentenced to
death, or convicted of a Class 1 felony, a Class 2 felony, or any felony for which the maxi-
mum penalty is imprisonment for life"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(e) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2006) (requiring that the claimant "did not by his own conduct cause or bring about
his conviction").
117. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 717-18.
118. ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 7 ("[C]onfessions per se should not preclude
recovery since some of them may be coerced .... Similarly, guilty pleas should not auto-
matically bar recovery, since innocent individuals may plead guilty in exchange for a
shorter sentence, rather than face a much lengthier sentence if convicted."); see also Rich-
ard P. Conti, The Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT &
WIrNESS PSYCHOL. 14, 20-23 (1999) (describing different types of false confessions). In
addition, false confessions are often a contributing cause of erroneous convictions. See
Gross et al., supra note 1, at 544 ("In fifty-one of the 340 exonerations between 1989 and
2004... the defendants confessed to crimes they had not committed."); ROB WARDEN,
CTR. ON WRONGFUL CoNvICrIONS, THE ROLE OF FALSE CONFESSIONS IN ILLINOIS
WRONGFUL MURDER CONvICrTIONS SINCE 1970 (2003), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/FalseConfessions2.htm ("Since 1970, 42 wrongful
murder convictions have been documented in Illinois. Twenty-five of the convictions, or
59.5%, rested in whole or part on false confessions."); see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard
A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891,
891 (2004) (analyzing 125 cases of "proven interrogation-induced false confessions").
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The amount of compensation also varies greatly among statutes. Wis-
consin's statute allows for a maximum award of $25,000,119 while the
North Carolina law provides a maximum award of $500,000.120 Some
statutes give greater compensation for a greater sentence received-for
instance, the federal compensation statute awards $100,000 per year of
incarceration for a wrongful death sentence, and $50,000 per year for any
other sentence. I Montana's compensation statute is unique in that it
offers no monetary compensation at all.'2 Instead, it provides only for
educational aid from the state.12
While many experts on compensation feel that most of the statutes cur-
rently in existence "need modernization,"'24 the fact that these states have
enacted such legislation at all is an important first step toward justice for
the wrongfully incarcerated.1' Regardless of the statutory differences,
the common theme evinced by the existence of these statutes is that legis-
lators in these states recognize the state's responsibility to compensate
the wrongfully incarcerated. 26 Next, it is necessary to convince legisla-
tures in states without compensation statutes that such laws should be
enacted to protect the innocent.' 27 One possible way to convince legisla-
tors that compensation is the state's responsibility is by using the eco-
nomic theory of the least cost avoider; a state legislature may be willing
to accept the premise that where both parties are innocent, the party that
119. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2001).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (2005).
121. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513(e) (West Supp. 2006). The rationale for raising the limit of
compensation for a death sentence seems to be to offer greater compensation for greater
harm, as the Act was amended in 2004 to raise the amount of compensation offered, and to
include this distinction between sentences. See generally id.
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2005).
123. Id. Unfortunately, Professor Bernhard notes that the reasoning for this type of
statute may be to give the appearance that the state is offering support to the wrongfully
incarcerated without having to actually offer any substantive support. Bernhard, supra
note 16, at 706.
124. ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 5; see also Bernhard, supra note 16, at 704-05
(noting that since the publication of her 1999 article when she found that most compensa-
tion statutes "offered compensation so skimpy as to be insulting," the modernization of
these statutes that she expected has not occurred).
125. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93 (arguing that the state has a moral obligation to
compensate those wrongfully incarcerated, and that by fulfilling that obligation, states
satisfy "[b]asic fairness").
126. See Zaremski, supra note 88, at 443 ("[Elach of these statutes represents a recog-
nition of the hardships faced by a wrongfully imprisoned individual, as well as an attempt
to redress egregious wrongs committed.").
127. See Bernhard, supra note 16, at 707 (understanding the need to convince state
legislators that these statutes should be enacted, Professor Bernhard aims "to motivate
state legislators to enact responsible, practical compensation statutes" through her arti-
cles).
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suffers the greater harm should benefit from the party who has the
greater ability to prevent that harm. 28
C. The Least Cost Avoider Theory Can Advance the Argument in Favor
of State Compensation
The theory of the least cost avoider is an economics-based theory most
commonly applied in cases that are largely value neutral-where neither
party engaged in wrongful conduct nor committed an inherently bad
act.' 29 It is a simple and rational theory stating that whichever party to a
dispute was in the best position to avoid the accident is the party who
should be held liable.' "The logic behind this theory is that liability will
encourage the least cost avoider to prevent the accident.',
31
An example involving a misunderstanding over a purchase order is il-
lustrative. 32 In Extrusion Painting, Inc., v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., the
buyer company wrote the number of feet of the product it wished to or-
der in the quantity field of the order form, rather than the number of
units it wished to order. 33 When the buyer received much more of the
product than expected, it did not want to pay for the extra, and the seller
company did not want to take the extra product back.34 The court held
that the buyer company, not the seller, must be held liable because it was
best able to avoid the accident in the situation; "it could simply have ex-
ercised greater care in drafting its purchase order.' ' 135 Although neither
party engaged in any wrongful conduct, avoidance of the accident was
most easily within the buyer's, as opposed to the seller's, control, so the
buyer is liable under the least cost avoider theory.136
128. See infra Part I.C. (discussing the least cost avoider theory and its underlying
rationale).
129. See, e.g., Extrusion Painting, Inc. v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., 40 F. App'x 97, 101-
02 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the least cost avoider theory to a situation in which neither
party committed a wrongful act). See generally H. Marlow Green, Note, Common Law,
Property Rights and the Environment: A Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments
in the United States and England and a Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 541,
581 (1997) ("The least-cost avoider consideration was introduced in scholarly efforts to
develop an instrumental framework to replace or to supplement negligence's case by case
analysis.").
130. See Jackson v. PKM Corp., 422 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Mich. 1988).
131. Id.; see also David W. Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law:
The Duty to Take Corrective Measures and Precautions, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 357, 365 (1994)
("If the imposition of liability on a defendant or denial of recovery of damages by a plain-
tiff creates incentives for the respective parties to take precautions, the law governing tort
liability must be designed to impose liability on the party best able to minimize costs.").
132. Extrusion Painting, 40 F. App'x at 98-99.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 99.
135. Id. at 101-02.
136. Id.
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The underlying goal of the theory is the application of preventive
measures in the future; "'[p]lacing liability with the least-cost avoider
increases the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures and
ensures that such measures would have the greatest marginal effect on
preventing the loss.
' ' 137
II. THE STATE MUST ACT To PREVENT ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS AND
COMPENSATE THE WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED
As discussed above, there are measures the state can take to stop erro-
neous convictions and wrongful incarceration in the first place.3 8 Until
that happens, however, the state must deal with the reality that many
individuals have suffered the injustice of wrongful incarceration. 9
A. The State Can Reduce the Likelihood of the Most Common Causes of
Erroneous Conviction
There are numerous preventive measures the state can take to combat
the most common causes of erroneous conviction.' 4 Some states have
already taken these measures, and other states should be encouraged to
141
do so.
1. New Eyewitness Identification Procedures
Psychological research has conclusively shown that employing double-
blind lineup procedures reduces the likelihood of mistaken eyewitness
identification. 42 This is something that is clearly within the state's con-
trol.4 1 In fact, it would be easy for states to adopt these practices, as im-
plementation is "extremely efficient," and can be done at "minimal
cost.
,,"
The Department of Justice notes in its Eyewitness Evidence Guide that
"[s]cientific research indicates that identification procedures such as line-
ups and photo arrays produce more reliable evidence when the individual
137. Conoco, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 289 F.3d 819, 826 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C., 5 F.3d 554,
557 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Silberman, J., concurring)).
138. See supra Part I.A.1-3.
139. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 74 ("Until recently, the assertion that innocent
people are routinely and frequently convicted was supported only by anecdotal witness
interviews and historical research .... Today recent developments in the forensic sci-
ences-particularly in DNA profiling-prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that mistakes
occur and that the innocent are convicted everywhere, in sizable numbers .... Certainty
compels action.").
140. See supra Part I.A.1-3.
141. See supra Part I.A.1-3.
142. Feige, supra note 45, at 28-29, 31.
143. See generally Farmer Memorandum, supra note 50, at 1-3.
144. Klobuchar et al., supra note 44, at 409.
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lineup members or photographs are shown to the witness sequentially...
rather than simultaneously., 14 States must be encouraged to adopt these
simple procedures that could have a profound impact on reducing the
most common cause of erroneous conviction.'4
6
2. Increased State Regulation of Crime Labs
Crime lab error, both innocent and intentional, is also contributing to
our justice system's failures. 47 Scientific evidence provides new ways of
establishing guilt or innocence, and its presence and prominence in the
courtroom has increased in the last quarter century.' 4' Such evidence,
often viewed as foolproof, '4 9 inspires confidence on the part of judges,
juries, lawyers, and the public alike that the decision reached at the end
of a trial is the correct one.5° However, recent scandals have brought to
light the fact that neither science, nor the scientist, is infallible. 15 Now
145. NIJ EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 9. Although the Depart-
ment of Justice has not stated that sequential lineups are preferable to simultaneous ones,
the agency does identify lineup procedures as an "area[] of potential change." Id. at 8-9.
146. See Melissa Dittman, Accuracy and the Accused, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL.,
July/Aug. 2004, at 74 (stating that Professor Gary Wells recommends that police use a
sequential, rather than simultaneous lineup because his research indicates the procedure
reduces the likelihood of a witness confusing different suspects' faces).
147. See supra Part I.A.2.
148. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 2, at iii.
149. See Harvey A. Silvergate et al., Forensic Evidence, the 'Infallible' Death Penalty,
and the Green Beret Murder Case, BOSTON PHOENIX, Oct. 10, 2003 (reporting that Massa-
chusetts Governor Mitt Romney is seeking to reinstate the death penalty in the state
"based on 'incontrovertible' scientific evidence that, as he says, will 'guarantee that we've
identified the guilty,"' and relating the story of Army Captain Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald, one
man erroneously convicted on the basis of such scientific evidence).
150. See id.; CNN Presents Classroom Edition: Reasonable Doubt: Can Crime Labs Be
Trusted? (CNN television broadcast Mar. 13, 2006) (program overview available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/EDUCATION/10/19/cnnpce.reasonable.doubt/index.html) (not-
ing that forensic evidence is often "decisive" in criminal court because it "can turn a ques-
tionable case into a slam-dunk conviction"). This perception of infallibility makes the
crime lab problem different from other failings of the criminal justice system. "The far-
reaching crime lab scandals roiling the courts are unlike other flaws in the criminal justice
system... because for years the reputation of the labs had been unquestioned." Possley,
Mills & McRoberts, supra note 60.
151. See Possley, Mills & McRoberts, supra note 60 ("Revelations of shoddy work and
poorly run facilities have shaken the criminal justice system like never before, raising
doubts about the reputation of labs as unbiased advocates for scientific truth."); see also
Beth Daley, Foolproof Forensics?: Even Science May Not Make a Death Sentence Infalli-
ble, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2004, at El (quoting a criminology professor as saying "'[t]he
premise is interesting that scientific evidence is more reliable than other evidence .... It
would be nice if it were true, [but iun the cases of wrongful conviction that we know about,
scientific evidence is a very significant factor."' (first omission in original)).
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that the problem has been recognized, it is in the hands of the states to
resolve it.152
There are measures a state can take to reduce the incidence of crime
lab error.153 First and foremost, crime labs should be regulated in the
114same way as medical labs. Medical labs are closely regulated at both
state and federal levels, and inspectors can revoke or suspend a lab's li-
cense for misconduct.5 1 "No such rules apply to crime labs."' 56 Regula-
tion of crime labs would serve to ensure the accuracy of scientific evi-
dence and decrease the likelihood of professional malpractice.57
In many states, state law enforcement agencies operate crime laborato-
ries."' Another recommendation designed to reduce crime lab error is
that the state remove the administration of crime labs from the jurisdic-
tion of police agencies.19 Creating a separate agency to administer crime
labs would ensure that someone is fighting for the best interests of the
lab,' 6 ensure that lab employees work with and for both the prosecution
152. See Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60 (noting that proposed solutions to crime lab
problems "fall into three categories: regulation, administration and resources," all things
within state control); see also Crime Lab Fact Sheet, supra note 55 (listing the "necessary
components [that states must implement to] ensur[e] crime lab quality").
153. See generally Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60; Crime Lab Fact Sheet, supra note
55; The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Crime Lab Oversight,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Crime-Lab-Oversight.php (last visited Apr. 19,2007).
154. See Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60; see also Crime Lab Fact Sheet, supra note 55
(recommending that states institute a system of accreditation and licensure and certifica-
tion requirements for lab personnel).
155. Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60.
156. Id.
157. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (requiring
labs to report professional misconduct, and requiring the Forensic Science Commission to
investigate all allegations of misconduct); see also NIJ FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra
note 62, at 4 (noting that "publication of best practices guides [by the Forensic Science
Commission] can improve the practice and acceptance of the forensic disciplines"); Presi-
dent's DNA Initiative, About the Initiative, supra note 16 (providing funding for forensic
laboratories "to improve the use of DNA in the criminal justice system").
158. See, e.g., Mass. State Police Crime Lab, Crime Lab Overview, http://www.mass.
gov/?pagelD=eopssubtopic&L=4&LO=Home&L1=Law+Enforcement+%26+Criminal+Ju
stice&L2=Criminal+Investigations&L3=State+Police+Crime+Lab&sid=Eeops (follow
"Crime Lab Overview" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) (indicating the state crime
lab is operated by the state police); see also Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60 ("The Wash-
ington State Patrol has operated the crime-laboratory system in this state for two dec-
ades.").
159. Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60; Forensic Science Misconduct, supra note 56 ("In
some instances, labs or their personnel are too closely tied to police and prosecutors, and
therefore not impartial.").
160. See, e.g., Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60 ("The [Washington State Patrol] has
been more interested in new patrol cars than in modern microscopes, and has not fought
vigorously for money and facilities to support the crime lab.").
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and the defense in each case, 6 and allow experts of different forensic
162
disciplines to share information.
These are just two examples of ways the state can combat crime lab er-
ror in the courts. Although implementing these recommendations
would cost the state some money, "it wouldn't be much."' 64 A Seattle
Times article reports that implementing these suggested improvements in
the state of Washington would cost twenty-four million dollars, only
three-tenths of one percent of that state's current budget.'65 Again, it
seems there is little reason for states not to make relatively simple
changes that could reduce the number of erroneous convictions.
3. Effective Indigent Defense Systems
Ineffective defense counsel often contributes to erroneous convic-
tions.1 67 However, states can, and therefore must, remedy their inade-
quate indigent defense systems.16 Both the U.S. Department of Justice
and the ABA have promulgated standards for the creation and mainte-
nance of quality indigent defense systems. 69
One important step in the improvement of defense systems is the crea-
tion of local standards. The Department of Justice has noted that
161. Id. (recommending that labs be removed from the control of the state police, and
saying that "[t]he change also would make the lab system independent of law enforcement
and, thus, equally answerable to prosecutors and defense attorneys").
162. Id. Forensic scientists themselves also support the sharing of information between
agencies. See NIJ FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 28-29. Those in the
forensic community also report a lack of sufficient resources available to crime labs today.
See id. at 5-8. Particularly, staff shortages, equipment shortages, and a lack of necessary
training programs are cited as the top concerns that must be addressed. Id. at 5-7.
163. See Crime Lab Fact Sheet, supra note 55 (listing other recommendations designed
to reduce the likelihood of crime lab error).
164. Guillen & Nalder, supra note 60.
165. Id. ("[A]s a tax, it would mean only $4.58 from each state resident, much of it a
one-time expense spread over 25 years. The more likely annual cost, per state resident,
would be less than $1.50.").
166. See generally id. (noting the relatively low cost and beneficial effects of crime lab
reform).
167. See supra Part I.A.3.
168. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-102 (2005) (attempting to fix the state's
deficient public defender system).
169. See generally Mary Lou Leary & Nancy E. Gist, Foreword to 1 INST. FOR LAW &
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2000), avail-
able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendium/pdftxt/voll.pdf. It should
be noted that although the U.S. Department of Justice published this document and links
to it on their website, it was not actually prepared by the Department, but "supported by a
contract with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice.
[Thus], [t]he opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not nec-
essarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice." Id.;
see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-1.1 (1992).
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"[i]mplementation of standards governing all aspects of indigent defense
systems can enhance the fairness and credibility of our justice system.,
17
1
Clear and definitive standards would serve to inform both attorneys and
the public as to what constitutes an adequate legal defense7
Also, it is critical that public defense offices receive adequate resources
and funds.17 1 It is well recognized that parity of funding, resources, and
workloads between defenders and prosecutors would increase the fair-
ness of our criminal justice system.173 However, only "[a] small minority
of jurisdictions in the United States have created and funded good public
defender offices ... which secure capable lawyers and provide ... ade-
quate compensation ... and investigative and expert assistance., 174 Ac-
176cess to resources must be improved, 5 funding must be raised, and
170. Leary & Gist, supra note 169; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 190 ("To
ensure high-quality defense services for the poor, performance standards should be en-
forced in every jurisdiction, with sanctions for individual lawyers or public defender or-
ganizations that fail to meet them.").
171. See Leary & Gist, supra note 169.
172. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-2.4 (1992) ("Assigned counsel
should receive prompt compensation at a reasonable hourly rate and should be reimbursed
for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses. Assigned counsel should be compensated for
all hours necessary to provide quality legal representation."); ABA TEN PRINCIPLES,
supra note 78, at 3 (listing examples of necessary resources: "benefits, technology, facili-
ties, legal research, support staff, paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services
and experts").
173. See ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 78, at 3; Scott Wallace, Parity: The Failsafe
Standard, in 1 INST. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 169, at 13, 13-17.
174. Bright, supra note 75, at 784.
175. See Adele Bernhard, Trends in Defense Service Standards, in 1 INST. FOR LAW &
JUSTICE, supra note 169, at 18, 19 (pointing out that "lack of resources is the primary cause
of inadequate criminal defense services").
176. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 188 (noting that some states impose a maxi-
mum fee that an attorney may receive for defending non-capital cases, and contending that
in some places the maximum is so low that "[a] kid selling sodas on a summer weekend at
Virginia Beach would make more money"). For a list of maximum compensation rates,
see THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-
APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE
OVERVIEW 3-12 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/compensationratesnoncapital2002-narrative.pdf; see also Bill Freeh-
ling, Poor Defendants Get Shortchanged: Public Defender Salaries Low, Caseloads Heavy,
FREE LANCE-STAR, Sept. 3, 2006, at Al (looking at pay differences between prosecutors
and defenders in Virginia, and stating: "Many local governments pay prosecutors a sup-
plement, but state law prevents public defenders from receiving the same, [so that a] recent
study showed that there is an average pay difference of about 24 percent between public
defenders and prosecutors in jurisdictions with a local supplement .... ).
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workloads must be kept to a reasonable level177 in order for public de-
fenders to fulfill their obligations to the community's poor.
178
Although these types of reforms may be costly, they are imperative to
our legal system.79 States have a constitutional obligation to provide
quality defense counsel to those who cannot afford it. 8 ' Justice demands
that indigent defense systems live up to the responsibilities outlined by
the Supreme Court, and states cannot avoid this duty.'
All the reforms suggested with regard to eyewitness identification pro-
cedures, crime labs, and defense systems can help reduce the rate of er-
roneous conviction by fighting the most common causes of error.""
However, there are still citizens who have suffered the injustice of wrong-
ful incarceration, and the state must take responsibility for compensating
those individuals.
83
B. The State Must Enact Compensation Statutes
Because tort suits and moral obligation bills are ineffective remedies,
state legislatures must pass compensation statutes.18 Such statutes are
the best way to compensate individuals wrongfully incarcerated, because
they offer a uniform (at least within each state), practical, and popular
approach to the problem.""
177. See ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 78, at 2 ("Defense counsel's workload is
controlled to permit the rendering of quality representation.").
178. See infra note 179; The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Bad Lawyer-
ing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited Apr. 19,
2007) ("The resources of the justice system are often stacked against poor defendants.
Matters only become worse when a person is represented by an ineffective, incompetent or
overburdened defense lawyer.").
179. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[L]awyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.").
180. Id.; See also Mary Lou Leary & Nancy E. Gist, Foreword to 2 INST. FOR LAW &
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2000), avail-
able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendium/pdftxt/vol2.pdf (quoting
Attorney General Janet Reno as saying "this effort is essential if our nation is to fulfill our
obligation under Gideon v. Wainwright to provide every criminal defendant charged with a
serious crime with competent counsel").
181. See Bright, supra note 75, at 783 ("Attorney General Janet Reno recently ob-
served that if justice is available only to those who can pay for a lawyer, 'that's not justice,
and that does not give people confidence in the justice system."').
182. See supra notes 142, 153, 170-72 and accompanying text.
183. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 73.
184. See Bernhard, supra note 16, at 707-12.
185. Id.
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1. Tort Suits Are Ineffective
As previously noted, the few tortious causes of action that offer the
possibility of relief require a plaintiff to meet nearly impossible legal re-
quirements."" In essence, an erroneously convicted individual can only
bring a claim against the state or an individual if there is clear evidence of
fault or negligence.'s Liability under the available causes of action thus
depends on finding an individual who was at fault.18 8 However, in typical
cases of erroneous conviction, "no single person can be described as hav-
ing been negligent or at fault." 89
Because the legal burdens on the plaintiff are so high in suits like these,
failure is practically a foregone conclusion.'O As a result, "[1]itigation
based on governmental tort liability has only been successful in a limited
handful of situations."' 9' Thus, tort suits are an ineffective and inade-
quate remedy in almost all cases of erroneous conviction.92
2. Moral Obligation Bills Are Inadequate
The discretionary nature of moral obligation bills prevents them from
being an effective means of compensation. As Professor Bernhard said,
"[w]ere 'moral obligation' bills universally available and uniformly ap-
plied, there would be no need to pass general indemnification legislation.
That is not the case., 193 In reality, private legislative bills offer compensa-
tion on an inconsistent basis,'94 and only to those lucky individuals whose
cases garner the sympathy of some influential person.195
186. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
187. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86 (noting that the common law torts of false impris-
onment and malicious prosecution, and the claim of legal malpractice, are available "only
when a claimant can establish that the person or entity responsible for the harm was negli-
gent"); see also Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433-35.
188. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86; Zaremski, supra note 88, at 434-35.
189. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86.
190. See id. ("[O]nly those convicted in jurisdictions with an indemnification statute
have a remedy at law for the harm suffered. Neither the common law torts of wrongful
arrest nor malicious prosecution, nor the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provide redress." (foot-
notes omitted)); Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433 (stating that the burdens placed on claim-
ants "greatly reduce any chance of success in obtaining compensation for their erroneous
imprisonment").
191. Zaremski, supra note 88, at 433.
192. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 86.
193. Id. at 94.
194. See ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 4 (referring to recovery under private bills
as a "lottery").
195. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 94 ("[T]he success of any such private bill depends
more on the political connections of the person introducing the bill and the political cli-
mate of the day than on the merits of the case."). Professor Bernhard also relates the case
of Edward Honaker, who did receive compensation through a legislative bill. Id. at 95.
Mr. Honaker was fortunate enough to be assisted by an attorney who also happened to be
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Even if an individual is lucky enough to catch the attention of the state
legislature, this is a "lengthy" and "uncertain" process.1  An individual
wishing to have a bill passed on his behalf "must find a state representa-
tive to draft such legislation, introduce it, ensure its passage, and gain the
governor's signature." 197 For these reasons, private legislative bills are
not an easy or effective remedy for those wrongfully incarcerated. 98
3. Compensation Statutes Are the Best Solution
Compensation statutes are the easiest and most effective way to offer
compensation to those wrongfully incarcerated, despite the risk of under-
compensation.19 Professor Bernhard has stated:
friends with one of the state legislators. Id. Professor Bernhard states that "[w]ithout [his]
well-connected advocate, no bill would have passed and no money would have been forth-
coming." Id.
196. Id. at 94.
197. ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 4.
198. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 94 ("Ultimately, the private bill remedy is an inade-
quate solution for individuals who have been wrongfully convicted.").
199. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 708; Johnston, supra note 25, at 420; Alberto B. Lo-
pez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted,
36 GA. L. REV. 665, 704 (2002). Regarding the problem of undercompensation, it should
be noted that the amounts awarded for claims brought under indemnification statutes are
far less than the amounts generally awarded in false imprisonment actions against private
parties:
The minimal statutory sums available to the unjustly convicted stand in sharp con-
trast with the amounts potentially available to victims of the similar common law tort
of false imprisonment. A federal court in Maryland awarded $850,000 to a young man
who had been unjustly held for ten minutes in an Eddie Bauer store while a store se-
curity officer falsely accused him of shoplifting. If this young man had been wrong-
fully convicted of a federal crime and imprisoned, he would have been entitled to a
maximum award of $5,000.
Id. at 705-06 (footnotes omitted). Although the federal compensation statute has been
amended to offer a higher level of compensation ($50,000 per year of incarceration for any
sentence but death), see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513(e) (West Supp. 2006), Lopez's point that pri-
vate false imprisonment awards are vastly greater than those offered by compensation
statutes still stands. Perhaps even more so than the federal statute, some state compensa-
tion statutes "cap the amount of recovery at artificially low levels." ABA REPORT, supra
note 105, at 3. Even some state officials recognize that compensation statutes do not offer
enough money to those whose freedom has been taken from them. See, e.g., John H.
White, Cheers, Tears End Men's 18-yr. Prison Ordeal, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 3, 1996, at 14
(quoting a state attorney as saying the $35,000 maximum compensation offered by the
state is "'clearly inadequate"' to recompense four men who each spent eighteen years in
prison).
Another major issue related to undercompensation is the lack of availability of reinte-
gration programs to the erroneously convicted: "Most of those who are exonerated are not
even entitled to the services given to people who are guilty of the crimes for which they
were convicted." ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 3. One reporter dubs this "the ulti-
mate indignity," finding it unbelievable that "[a]fter they get out, most inmates are on
parole or supervised release and have access to counseling, job services and other oppor-
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The necessary law is simple, clear and effective. The remedy is
not expensive and does not require creation of new bureaucratic
agencies. ... Most importantly, a legislative remedy is the only
reliable and fair response to the inevitable mistakes that occur as
a byproduct of the operation of a criminal justice system as large
200as ours.
In addition, compensation statutes are generally accepted among law-201 202
yers, courts, and the public.03 "Popular support is largely responsible
for the few new statues enacted in [recent] years. ''21 It is clear then, that
a general statute is the preferable means of compensation.
Accordingly, any state that does not have such a statute should enact
one that complies with the guidelines offered by the ABA.205 Any state
that does have a compensation statute should work to improve the stat-
tunities to improve themselves.... But in most states, the wrongly convicted get nothing."
Ove, supra note 1.
In addition, the Life After Exoneration Program lists a number of other problems faced
by those erroneously convicted and incarcerated:
Exonerees face a host of legal problems that get in the way of rebuilding a life on
the outside. Even after they win release on grounds of innocence, there is no auto-
matic expungement of the wrongful conviction from the exoneree's criminal record.
As a result, exonerees applying for jobs or housing are often disqualified after a back-
ground check reveals their past conviction.
A [Life After Exoneration Program] survey of exonerees nationwide showed that
nearly all emerge from prison with no assets, many having spent their life savings (and
that of their family) on the legal battle to win their freedom. [One third of those sur-
veyed] lost custody of a child during (and because of) wrongful conviction. As a re-
sult, many exonerees need on-going legal assistance with matters such as bankruptcy
and child custody.
Life After Exoneration Program, Legal Issues, http://www.exonerated.org/legal.php (last
visited Apr. 19, 2007).
200. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 73-74.
201. See generally ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 1 ("The [ABA] urges federal,
state, local and territorial jurisdictions to enact statutes to adequately compensate persons
who have been convicted and incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.").
202. See Bernhard, supra note 16, at 726, 738 (examining recent cases in which courts
have granted compensation based on "creative strategies," and asserting that "[i]n the
absence of... compensation statutes ... courts will not wait for the legislature to act").
203. See id. at 711 (noting that "the public overwhelmingly supports providing assis-
tance to those who have been harmed by the criminal justice system through no fault of
their own"); see also Ove, supra note 1; Editorial, What Price for 18 Years?, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Sept. 18, 2003, at 18A.
204. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 712.
205. See generally Bernhard, supra note 17, at 101-10 (recommending some of the
reforms listed in the ABA report, such as not precluding claims where a guilty plea or false
confession was involved, and eliminating the pardon requirement). The ABA report
should serve as a guideline for enacting compensation statutes because the opinion of the
ABA is respected in the legal community, and states have adopted their recommendations
in the past. See supra note 111.
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ute so that it, too, complies with the ABA recommendations.2l State
compliance with these guidelines will ensure that those wrongfully incar-
cerated are given a fair chance to seek compensation from the state.2M A
review of the most common arguments in the state compensation debate
will reveal the reasons why some states have not yet enacted compensa-
tion statutes, and why others have.
C. Common Arguments on Both Sides of the State Compensation Debate
The debate surrounding state compensation of the wrongfully incarcer-
ated began centuries ago. 8 Consequently, there are a number of con-
vincing and well-formulated arguments on both sides of the discussion.
1. Practical Arguments
One practical argument against enacting compensation legislation is
that the cost of implementing such legislation would be too great.2 9 The
fear is that the number of exonerations will continue to rise, and the state
will be liable for paying out more than it can afford to those bringing
claims under the statute."'
A second practical argument is that individuals who do not deserve to
be compensated will receive money at the state's expense.2 1' The main
fear embodied in this argument is that individuals who have contributed
to their own convictions should not be able to recover from the state.212
Both of these seemingly legitimate concerns are unfounded . 3 With re-




Among states with indemnification statutes, New York has one of the
most generous.21 ' Even so, the state budget has not been threatened-of
206. ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 5. In particular, states should not "limit recov-
ery to felony convictions." Id. at 6. States should codify the principle that "[a] false con-
fession or guilty plea does not automatically bar recovery." Id. at 7.
207. See Bernhard, supra note 16, at 708-09 (explaining that compensation statutes are
the most rational and easy way to ensure uniform and fair compensation).
208. Zaremksi, supra note 88, at 430 ("Evidence indicates that the movement for gov-
ernmental compensation of wrongfully imprisoned individuals began to take shape in late
eighteenth century France.").
209. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 713.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 717 ("[I]t is legitimate to guard against recovery by individuals whose
behavior impeded the 'truth-seeking' function of a police investigation, just as the doctrine
of comparative negligence works to limit damage awards for those who are partially re-
sponsible for their own injury.").
213. Id. at 713.
214. Gary Young, No Easy Windfalls for Exonerated: Wrongfully Imprisoned Have
Uphill Fight, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16,2002, at Al.
215. See Lopez, supra note 199, at 720; Young, supra note 214.
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214 claims filed since the statute was enacted in 1984, only 31 claimants
have recovered, and the average award per case is only $457,000.216
The undeserving claimant theory is also without merit."' Legislatures
can carefully draft a statute to prevent unwarranted claims from being
considered.21 For instance, including simple pleading requirements, such
as having to prove that a claimant was convicted, sentenced, and impris-
oned for a period of time, would reduce the number of claims.219 In addi-
tion, requiring a claimant to prove that his conviction was overturned
based on actual innocence, and clearly defining "actual innocence," will
prevent those whose convictions were overturned on procedural grounds
from recovering.20
In addition, it must be remembered that a compensation statute does
not call for immediate and unquestioned state compensation; instead,
such a statute merely creates a cause of action.2' Actions brought under
an indemnification statute are tried before judges who determine
whether compensation should be awarded based on the merits of the
case. m Judges are entrusted with many serious and influential tasks in
our society; it follows that they can also determine which individuals are
deserving of state funds.22 In addition to these practical arguments, there
are also important theoretical arguments regarding a state's responsibility
216. Bernhard, supra note 16, at 715-16 (twelve claims prevailed in court, and nineteen
settled out of court).
217. Id. at 713.
218. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 97, 99-100 (analyzing crime victims' compensation
statutes, "which were enacted to assist a similarly situated class of innocent injured people"
as indemnification statutes, and noting that those "bills were carefully drafted to respond
to [the] concerns" that such a system would be "unmanageable," so that as a result, the
program has been a "success").
219. See id. at 101-02 (noting that this simple requirement is one way legislators aim to
"ensur[e] that the truly innocent are compensated while simultaneously limiting the prolif-
eration of non-meritorious claims.").
220. See ABA REPORT, supra note 105, at 6 ("Claimants must be able to show that
their convictions were vacated or pardoned on a ground demonstrating actual innocence,
which for this purpose requires that the claimant did not commit the crime, or the crime
did not occur.").
221. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) ("Not-
withstanding any provisions of this chapter to the contrary, a wrongfully imprisoned indi-
vidual has and may file a civil action against the state, in the court of claims, to recover a
sum of money as described in this section, because of the individual's wrongful imprison-
ment. The court of claims shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over such a civil ac-
tion.").
222. See, e.g., id.; see also Bernhard, supra note 17, at 104.
223. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 104-05 ("[T]here is a wealth of judicial experience
applying [the New York statute]. The decisions illustrate that the New York Court of
Claims has had no difficulty distinguishing-on the pleadings-between those petitions
appropriate for determination on the merits and those which fail to state a claim.").
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to compensate in the typical case of erroneous conviction where there has
been no inherently wrongful act.
2. Theoretical Arguments
One argument against state compensation is that "the state in adminis-
tering justice . . . can not be held accountable in law for the burdens
which particular individuals may have to suffer., 224 The state has no legal
obligation to compensate.m The reasoning behind this argument is that
by choosing to live in a particular jurisdiction, a citizen assumes the risk
that he may be required to bear burdens others are not asked to bear,
226such as erroneous conviction.
A second argument is that there can be "no liability without fault."' 27
The rationale behind this approach is that if the actor has no malicious
intent and the injury was not foreseeable, then there is no fault,2 s and it is
unfair to hold a faultless party responsible for accidental harm.229 For
these reasons, when the state obtained a conviction through normal legal
channels, and did not intentionally incarcerate an innocent individual, it
should not be held financially responsible for the error.
These arguments are most commonly rebutted with two theories sup-
porting the idea that the state should allow individuals to seek compensa-
tion for wrongful incarceration - a takings argument and a strict liability
argument.230 The takings argument for compensation is based on the doc-
trine of eminent domain, embodied in the Fifth Amendment phrase, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." 23' The argument posits that this same principle should be applied
to the taking of one's liberty because liberty is "a right at least as sacred
as that of property., 232 Accordingly, when the state takes a person's lib-
erty for public use-the public use being "the preservation of peace"-
the state should compensate him.z3
224. Borchard, supra note 24, at 694.
225. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 92 ("Clearly, states have no obligation, enforce-
able in law, to indemnify.").
226. Borchard, supra note 24, at 694. The state cannot be expected to compensate
every citizen forced to bear an unjust burden within its boundaries; "[c]ertain harms are
simply accepted as part of life." See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 92-93.
227. Borchard, supra note 24, at 696.
228. Jack M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERs L. REV.
1,21-22 (1986).
229. See Borchard, supra note 24, at 696 ("This principle ... has been incorporated into
the civil or private law of all civilized countries.....").
230. Borchard, supra note 18, at 207-08; Zaremski, supra note 88, at 431.
231. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
232. Borchard, supra note 18, at 207.
233. Zaremski, supra note 88, at 431-32. Howard S. Master offers a new theory of how
eminent domain applies in this context: instead of treating liberty as what was "taken,"
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The strict liability theory assumes that in "any great undertaking...
there are bound to be a number of accidents." Because all citizens
benefit from the operation of the criminal justice system (in the form of
increased public safety), it is unfair that only one person should bear the
cost of an error such as wrongful incarceration simply because he was the
unlucky victim of the mistake. 5 Instead, everyone should bear the bur-
den equally.2
6
The strict liability argument has been the most effective in diffusing the
theories proffered by opponents. This is mainly due to technical prob-
lems in applying the eminent domain theory, such as how "property" is
defined. 7 However, the strict liability theory has not proven strong
enough to convince some states that compensation is necessary, as nearly
half of all states still do not have statutes to compensate the wrongfully
incarcerated . 8 The strict liability argument must be strengthened in or-
der to further this cause.
III. BECAUSE THE STATE IS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN THE
INDIVIDUAL TO PREVENT ERRONEOUS CONVICTION, IT SHOULD BE
HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPENSATING THE WRONGFULLY
INCARCERATED
Contemporary science has provided a clear view of our criminal justice
system's failures.139 An understanding of these failures offers a new per-
spective on the compensation debate, and advocates of reform should use
Master argues that "[t]he property that was 'taken' within the meaning of state or federal
takings clauses was the value of the productive labor that was appropriated by government
during imprisonment." Howard S. Master, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 120 (2004).
234. Borchard, supra note 18, at 208.
235. See id.; Zaremski, supra note 88, at 432; see also Rosenn, supra note 25, at 716
("The reparation of damages caused by erroneous criminal accusations, irrespective of
how well founded they seemed, is properly a cost of the operation of the criminal justice
system. It is difficult to see why the innocent victims should be forced to absorb this
cost.").
236. See King, supra note 90, at 1093 n.14 ("Those who derive the benefit of such an
undertaking... should share the loss incurred by the victim of that error.").
237. Id. at 1092-93. One reason the strict liability argument is generally favored is
because "the eminent domain thesis raises a specter of technical obstacles to recovery
obfuscating the more immediate issue of redress." Id. "This is due in part to restrictive
definitions of 'property' for eminent domain purposes and the notion that the government
should receive tangible benefit from the taking." Id. at 1093 n.15.
238. See Compensation Statutes Chart, supra note 15. The problem is not that the
strict liability argument is defective, but that some states are simply "reluctan[t] to com-
pensate." Bernhard, supra note 16, at 707. Thus, this Comment does not attempt to re-
place or fix the strict liability argument, but merely tries to add another element to help
decrease reluctance among states.
239. See supra note 139.
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the theory this Comment puts forth to convince legislators that compen-
sation is indeed the state's responsibility.
A. The Least Cost Avoider Theory Can Be Applied to Errors of the
Criminal Justice System
The least cost avoider theory posits that in cases of accidental harm, the
party that was best able to avoid the harm by taking preventive measures
must be held liable. 24° This creates an incentive to implement the cau-
tionary measures in his control, thereby preventing, or at least decreas-
ing, the likelihood of the accident in the future.24'
In the context of the compensation debate, the accidental harm is the
erroneous conviction and the subsequent loss of individual liberty.242
Preventing this harm in the future is a noble and important goal, and the
party best able to achieve it is the state.243 With the advent of DNA test-
ing came more exonerations, and thus, many more research opportunities
to uncover the root causes of erroneous convictions.2" The resulting evi-
dence has conclusively revealed that the most common causes of errone-
ous conviction -mistaken eyewitness identification, crime lab error, and
ineffective defense counsel-can all be decreased through state preven-
tive actions.2' As discussed, research has shown that implementing rela-
tively simple lineup procedures can greatly reduce the likelihood of mis-
taken eyewitness identification.2" Likewise, changes in crime lab admini-
stration and regulation can decrease the incidence of crime lab error.247
240. See Extrusion Painting, Inc. v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., 40 F. App'x 97, 101-02
(6th Cir. 2002).
241. Conoco, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 289 F.3d 819, 826 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
242. Cf. Extrusion Painting, 40 F. App'x at 98-102 (identifying that neither party com-
mitted an inherently bad act, but harm still resulted). Likewise, although neither the state
nor the individual commits an inherently bad act in the case of most erroneous convictions,
wrongful incarceration sometimes results.
243. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93 ("[S]ociety is in a better position to bear the
cost of the injury than is the person who has been wrongly convicted .. "); see also supra
Part II.A (illustrating that the state could take specific measures to reduce the likelihood
of erroneous convictions). The state is in a better position to prevent the harm caused by
erroneous conviction because it controls and administers the criminal justice system,
whereas an individual defendant has no control over the causes of erroneous conviction.
See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93 ("What distinguishes the situation of the wrongly con-
victed from that of others who have been accidentally injured is the state's involvement.
After all, it is the state, through operation of one of its most essential services-the crimi-
nal justice system-that has inflicted the harm.").
244. Reinstein, supra note 27, at xxi.
245. See supra Part I.A.
246. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
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In addition, reform of indigent defense systems will result in a lower
probability of receiving ineffective counsel at trial.m
With this information in hand, there can be no doubt that the state, as
opposed to the wrongfully incarcerated individual, is best able to avoid
the harm in this situation.2 49 As in the case of the misunderstood pur-
chase order, the state can simply use greater care in administering the
criminal justice system, whereas the individual is powerless to change the
inner workings of the legal system.' Following the least cost avoider
theory to its end, holding the state accountable for this harm provides an
incentive to implement the preventive measures in its control, thereby
decreasing the number of erroneous convictions overall.nl
It may be argued that once a state enacts the suggested preventive
measures, erroneous convictions may still occur, and this theory will no
longer serve to hold the state strictly liable.n2 Undoubtedly, even with
improvements in the criminal justice system, the state is still in a better
position than the individual to prevent erroneous convictions. 5 Liability
248. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 243.
250. Cf. Extrusion Painting, Inc. v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., 40 F. App'x 97, 98-102
(holding that the buyer, as opposed to the seller is best able to avoid the accident by simply
taking greater care). By analogy, it is clear that the state, as opposed to the wrongfully
incarcerated individual, is the best able to prevent the accidental harm in this situation by
simply taking greater care in administering criminal justice.
251. See Conoco, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 289 F.3d 819, 826 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (argu-
ing that liability creates incentive); supra Part II.A (discussing how preventive measures
can decrease the likelihood of erroneous convictions). As Howard S. Master said:
Expansion of governmental liability for erroneous convictions may benefit society
if it encourages government to take greater care in using the criminal justice system to
obtain convictions. By shifting costs of error from the wrongfully convicted individ-
ual to the government that secured the wrongful conviction, a full compensation re-
gime should encourage government agents to take precautions necessary to avoid
wrongful convictions. Assuming that government actors will be motivated by the
threat of public or individual liability for the criminal justice system's mistakes, provi-
sion of full compensation should cause prosecutors' motives to be properly aligned
with their ethical duties to do justice and seek truth.
Master, supra note 233, at 110-11 (footnotes omitted).
This theory is particularly persuasive in this instance because there is "no risk of dimi-
nution in precaution on the part of the other party." Interview with Marin Scordato, As-
soc. Professor of Law, The Catholic Univ. of America, Columbus Sch. of Law, in Wash.,
D.C. (Oct. 25, 2006).
In some cases where this theory is applied, there is a risk that the party not being held
liable will be less careful in his endeavors because he knows he will not be held responsible
for an accident. Id. Here, however, there is no such risk-the innocent defendant is not
going to be more careless in his defense because he knows he will be compensated for time
spent wrongfully incarcerated. Id. There is "no corresponding let down" on the part of
the individual that results from holding the state responsible. Id.
252. Interview with J.P. Ogilvy, Professor of Law, The Catholic Univ. of America,
Columbus Sch. of Law, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 19, 2006).
253. See Bernhard, supra note 16, at 93; Interview with Marin Scordato, supra note 251.
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still serves as an incentive for the state to research, test, and implement
new and better methods and practices for use in the criminal justice sys-
tem, whereas holding the individual liable would not serve any incentive
purpose.54 Consequently, the state must be held strictly liable for com-
pensating the wrongfully incarcerated, and compensation statutes must
be enacted to fulfill this duty.255
B. Convincing Legislatures that Compensation Is the State's
Responsibility
Because the enactment of compensation statutes is solely within the
hands of state legislatures, advocates must convince them that compensa-
256tion is the state's responsibility. The least cost avoider theory can be
used to demonstrate the logic of holding the state strictly liable for com-
pensation. Previous arguments in favor of state compensation have
been based mainly on moral and philosophical grounds,"" generally ap-
pealing to one's sense of compassion and sympathy.5 9 Such arguments
have not proven sufficient to convince some states.260
Instead, it must be argued that it is not only a general "sense of justice
and equity" that should compel states to compensate the wrongfully in-
carcerated.26 Rather, the state must be held accountable because it is in a
better position than the individual defendant to prevent erroneous con-
victions from taking place in the future.262
Most importantly, the end goal of the theory is to reduce the number of
erroneous convictions by providing an incentive for the state to imple-
ment the preventive measures in its control. 6' Achieving this end is in
the best interest of the state and its citizens because if people are not er-
roneously convicted, no one will have to bear the cost of wrongful incar-
254. Interview with Marin Scordato, supra note 251. The individual simply has no
control over the common causes of erroneous convictions. Id.
255. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 101 (recognizing the "need for indemnification
legislation and the persistent call to enact it"). Professor Bernhard notes that recent scien-
tific advances prove that innocent people are convicted, and that such "knowledge ...
compels action." Id. at 112.
256. See id.
257. See Jackson v. PKM Corp., 422 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Mich. 1988) (explaining the logic
of the theory); see also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
25& See Borchard, supra note 18, at 207-08 (stating that the takings argument is based
on the idea that liberty is at least as sacred as property, and the strict liability theory is
based on ideas of fairness).
259. See Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93.
260. See generally Compensation Statutes Chart, supra note 15.
261. Bernhard, supra note 17, at 93.
262. See supra Parts I.A., II.A.
263. See Extrusion Painting, Inc. v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., 40 F. App'x 97, 101-02
(6th Cir. 2002).
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ceration. 264 Accordingly, this theory further supports the argument that
compensation of the wrongfully incarcerated is a state responsibility,
which may convince legislators to enact compensation statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent increase in exonerations has produced a body of research
proving that states have the power to reduce the rate of erroneous con-
victions through preventive measures. Consequently, the state should
bear the burden of compensating those wrongfully incarcerated because
the individual has no control over the situation, and because it would
provide some incentive for the state to enact the preventive measures.
Unfortunately, most states have yet to recognize this responsibility.
Thus, the fate of the wrongfully incarcerated lies in the hands of advo-
cates, who must continue to work toward convincing legislators that
compensation statutes are necessary to protect the innocent, and to work
toward reducing the rate of erroneous convictions.
264. Cf. id. (finding that if the buyer had not made a mistake in filling out the purchase
order, there would have been no harm and no resulting cost to either party). If erroneous
convictions are eliminated, there would be no harm in the form of wrongful incarceration,
and no cost to either the state or the individual. It is axiomatic that if there is no harm, no
one will have to bear the cost.
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